This paper investigates an extended version of Crawford-Sobel's (1982) communication game in which the principal can control the quality of the expert's information. We prove that the optimal quality of information is always bounded away from the full information and characterize the optimal information structure that maximizes players'ex-ante payo¤s. Based on this, we show that our mechanism provides a superior ex-ante payo¤ for the principal, compared to both Crawford-Sobel's most informative equilibrium and optimal delegation. We then study multi-stage communication. This modi…cation results in further ex-ante Pareto improvement since it allows for the step-by-step re…nement of the expert's information, preserving truth-telling communication at every stage. Finally, we construct a mechanism in which approximately full information is revealed for a large sub-interval of the state space.
Introduction
Situations in which principals do not have enough information and have to consult experts before implementing a policy can be found almost everywhere. Auctioneers consult experts about an object's value before setting auction rules, managers consult …nancial and marketing analysts before making corporate decisions, and politicians consult advisors on special subjects.
Despite the apparently di¤erent nature of these situations, several common features characterize virtually every process of communication. The …rst is a con ‡ict of interest between the involved parties. As a result, the expert may want to withhold true information or provide it only partially, since releasing all information could be harmful for her. One can expect that the larger the con ‡ict of interest, the less useful will be the information I am grateful to Paul Fischer, Bart Lipman, Dirk Bergemann, Yossi Feinberg, and Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz for valuable suggestions and discussions. Especially, I am indebted to Vijay Krishna and Kalyan Chatterjee for invaluable guidance. All mistakes are my own. provided by the expert. The second feature is the imperfect primary information of the expert. Even the most knowledgeable expert may not be completely informed. Moreover, quite often the principal has the power to control the ‡ow of information available to the expert. For example, governments (principals) usually collect reports from oil companies (experts) to estimate the amount of oil in oil…elds before making a decision about a lease sale. Depending on the company's report, a government decides whether to sell an oil…eld separately (if it consists of several parts) or as a whole piece. It may conduct an auction or approach just one company. In the former case, the government sets auction rules: its type, a reserve price, etc. This behavior constitutes an incentive for companies to distort their information in a favorable way, since the government's policies are in ‡uenced by their estimates. For its part, the government can restrict the company's quality of information by specifying the number and locations of test drills. Finally, the communication process between parties can be conducted on a multi-stage basis -the government can request a new report after each test drill. Thus, the principal a¤ects the precision of the expert's information before communication at every stage, whereas the expert can update her report afterwards. 1 The …rst analysis of strategic communication is due to Crawford and Sobel [6] in their seminal paper. They introduce a model of a perfectly informed expert and an uninformed principal whose payo¤s depend on a random state of nature. After a private observation of the true state, the expert sends a costless message to the principal. On the basis of the message received, the principal implements an action, determining the parties' payo¤s. Crawford and Sobel show that full information revelation is never possible unless players' interests perfectly match. In addition, when a con ‡ict of interest arises, the quality of the disclosed information falls, eventually resulting in an equilibrium with no useful information conveyed.
Crawford and Sobel's characterization of the equilibria is predicated upon two assumptions. First, the expert is perfectly informed about the realization of the state of nature. Second, the communication process consists of one stage only. This paper studies the e¤ects of relaxing both of these assumptions. In many cases, even the most professional experts may have only insu¢ cient or noisy information. Furthermore, a principal can directly restrict their access to information. In addition, instead of a one-stage communication process, the principal can gradually improve information precision of the expert in every stage and request a new report, conditional on the expert's updated information.
We study the simplest model which incorporates both discussed features: communication through multiple stages and imperfect information of the sender, the quality of which is controlled by the receiver at every stage.
Our major contribution can be summarized as follows. We demonstrate that by prop- 1 The Mineral Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department of the Interior does not perform any direct data-collection activities. Instead, it issues permits to industry for collecting prelease geological and geophysical data. In general, companies wishing to collect data on the Outer Continental Shelf prior to a lease sale must obtain a permit from the MMS. The permits set forth the speci…c details for each datagathering activity, including the area where the data are collected, the timing of the data-gathering activity, approved equipment and methods, and other similar detailed information relevant to each speci…c permit. After a permit is granted, the MMS monitors all …eld data collection activities to ensure compliance with the terms of the permit. It is empowered to select and obtain data that are collected by private …rms. The MMS uses the obtained data for several purposes, including evaluation of tracts'market values, determination of bidding procedures, leasing, and post-lease operations.
erly restricting the quality of the expert's information, the principal can foster expert's incentives to communicate. This results in a higher quality of the information transmitted, compared to Crawford-Sobel (hereafter, CS) uniform-quadratic model. Thus, more information may be obtained from a less informed expert. We characterize the optimal information structure of the expert and show that the trade-o¤ between the imperfect information of the expert and her incentives to reveal it results in ex-ante Pareto improvement. Moreover, our model leads to a superior outcome for the principal than optimal delegation (whenever the informative communication exists). 2 In generalizations of our base setting, we demonstrate how to extend the analysis to a wider class of players'preferences and distribution functions. In the more general setting, the principal prefers communication with an imperfectly informed expert to that with a perfectly informed expert whenever informative communication is feasible, and to optimal delegation as long as players'interests are su¢ ciently close.
The main result for multi-stage communication is that the combination of multi-stage communication with imperfect information of the expert is so powerful that the principal can achieve (almost) full information revelation over a large interval of states. We introduce a mechanism through which the expert truthfully discloses all available information at each stage of the communication process. This allows the principal to implement a policy as close as needed to his ideal policy when the number of communication stages is arbitrary large. The result basically relies on the following intuition: step-by-step updating of the expert's information at every stage can be organized in such a way that the expert has a possibility to induce only those actions which are either optimal for the policymaker or essentially di¤erent from the expert's ideal policy, given expert's current information.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 highlights an example, which illustrates that the optimal information structure is coarse and involves a …nite number of partition elements. Section 4 presents the formal model of one-stage communication. The general analysis of the one-stage model is provided in Section 5. Section 6 extends the analysis to the multi-stage case. Section 7 introduces an extension of the multi-stage model and discusses results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
The fact that quality of information of the principal is not monotone in that of the expert was …rst recognized by Fischer and Stocken [8] . They, however, restrict the set of possible biases in players'preferences b, introduced by Crawford and Sobel [6] , to that of the discrete form b = Players'state-relevant utility functions are quadratic:
where a parameter b > 0 re ‡ects the bias in the players'interests. First, consider the case of the perfectly informed expert. Crawford and Sobel demonstrate that all the equilibria are characterized by …nite monotone partitions. That is, for any b there exists at most N CS (b) < 1 number of intervals on the state space such that the expert sends one message for each interval (w k ; w k+1 ], which is associated with a corresponding action a k = w k +w k+1 2
. 7 Also, there are exactly N CS (b) equilibria with 1; 2; :::; N CS (b) intervals, where the equilibrium with N CS (b) intervals is Pareto superior to all other equilibria.
For example, if b = However, if the principal controls the expert's information structure in a such way that the expert knows only whether is higher or lower than 1 2 , then she must estimate the average utility across all states, given available information. This shifts her preferences in a way favorable for the principal. Then, the expert truthfully reveals her information that provides the principal's expected utility U R = 1 48 , which is essentially higher than that in the case of the perfectly informed expert.
Moreover, there exists an equilibrium with three messages, namely, for less than . A …ner information structure violates the sender's incentives to communicate truthfully, which results in distortion of information and lower principal's payo¤s. 8 
The Model
Consider a uniform-quadratic setup of the CS model, in which the principal takes control over the quality of the expert's information about the state. 9 We call this modi…cation the CWIIE model (Communication With an Imperfectly Informed Expert). The key modi…cation of our model is a preliminary stage, in which the receiver speci…es the sender's information structure at zero cost. In particular, the receiver partitions into a …nite number n of intervals W k = (w k ; w k+1 ], k 2 K = f0; 1; :::; n 1g, w 0 = 0, w n = 1. Equivalently, a partition is described by a strictly increasing sequence (w k ) n 0 of its boundary points. We call a partition uniform of size n if (w k )
The timing of the game is as follows. At the …rst stage, the receiver speci…es a partition = fW k g n 1 0
, and a message set M . At the second stage, a realization of the state 7 Formally, Crawford and Sobel de…ne equilibrium strategies in a slightly di¤erent way. They require m ( ) to be uniformly distributed on [w k ; w k+1 ], if w 2 (w k ; w k+1 ), and a (m) =
for all m 2 (w k ; w k+1 ).
8 Like Crawford and Sobel, we use the term "…ner"informally, implying a partition with a larger number of elements. 9 Later, we will analyze generalizations of this setting in terms of players' preferences, distributions of the state, and the number of stages of communication.
occurs, and the sender privately observes an element of the partition W k , which contains . We denote this sender as a k-type. Thus, the sender's imperfect information about a state is determined by the uniform distribution over W k , and a measure of the sender's imprecision about the state is P (W k ) = Pr ( 2 W k ) = w k+1 w k . At the third stage, the sender transmits a costless message m 2 M to the receiver. In general, the sender may mix over messages with a conditional distribution (mjk). After receiving the message, the receiver updates his beliefs about the state and implements an action a that determines the players'payo¤s.
Let M ( a) = fm : a (m) = ag. We say that an action a is induced by a k-type, if R M ( a) (mjk) dm > 0, and is purely induced if R M ( a)
(mjk) dm = 1.
Notice that the described information structure assumes monotonicity of partitions. That is, 2 W k , 0 2 W j , j > k implies that < 0 . This feature of the model is consistent with the argument of feasibility: it is di¢ cult for the principal to implement an information system such that the expert's information has a form of "a true state is either high or low, but not intermediate". In addition, all characterized equilibria in the CS model have the information structure of the monotone partitional form.
Equilibrium
Given information structure , a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter, equilibrium) ( (mjk) ; a (m) ; ) consists of a signaling strategy : ! M , which speci…es a probability distribution (mjk) over the space of messages for each type k, the principal's action's rule a : M ! R, and a belief function G : M ! , which speci…es a probability distribution over for each message m.
The action's rule a (m) maximizes the receiver's utility U R (ajm) = E [U R (a; ) jm] given his belief function G ( jm), which is constructed on the basis of Bayes'rule. 10 Given the action's rule a (m), the signaling strategy maximizes the sender's type-relevant utility function
That is, the sender's strategy (mjk) satis…es
Notice that U S (a; bjW k ) can be written as
where
is a conditional mean of the state given the sender's type, and
Similarly, the principal's type-relevant utility function U R (ajW k ) can be represented as
The action's rule a (m) is the solution of the principal's problem given his belief function G ( jm):
The density of the belief function g ( jm) = G 0 ( jm) is constructed on the basis of Bayes'rule
where 1 W k ( ) is the indicator function and g (m) =
Then, we can represent U R (ajm) as
, and U R (ajW k ) = U S (a; 0jW k ) is the principal's type-relevant utility function.
The receiver's expected utility is
The following section provides the general analysis of the model.
One-Stage Communication
This section characterizes the optimal information structure in the one-stage version of the model. We demonstrate that if the con ‡ict of interest between parties is such that CS communication is informative, then the principal prefers communication with the imperfectly informed expert to both CS communication and optimal delegation. These results hold in more general settings.
To highlight the main intuition behind better communication with the imperfectly informed expert, consider the above example of b = Fig. 1 ). For lower types < w 1 , the action a 0 is strictly better than a 1 , and vice versa. However, if sender's information is only whether a state is lower or higher than w 1 , then she estimates the average utility across all states in the partition's element. The typerelevant utility function U S (a; bjW k ) is strictly concave in a and symmetric with respect to the optimal policy a S k = w k + b. Note that a S k < a S (w k+1 ), where a S (w k+1 ) = w k+1 + b is the optimal policy of the CS type w k+1 . That is, if the sender knows that 2 W 0 = (0; w 1 ], then she strictly prefers action a 0 to a 1 . Similarly, if the sender knows that 2 W 1 = (w 1 ; 1], then she strictly prefers action a 1 to a 0 . Through sending corresponding messages, the sender conveys all available information regardless of her type. Since speci…ed actions are the receiver's best response to the sender's strategy, we construct an equilibrium, which replicates the CS equilibrium in terms of disclosed information. Moreover, since utility functions U S (a; bjW k ) and actions a 0 and a 1 are continuous in w 1 , a partition (0; w 0 ; 1) is still incentive-compatible for all w 0 in some neighborhood of w 1 . Thus, the principal can e¤ectively modify the CS information structure without violating sender's incentives to communicate truthfully.
Equilibrium Characterization
In this subsection, we outline the basic characteristics of equilibrium strategies. It follows from (3) and (4) that for any sender's type, players' preferences over actions are purely determined by means w k . That is, U S (a; bjW k ) U S (a 0 ; bjW k ) if and only if U S (a; b; w k ) U S (a 0 ; b; w k ), and U R (ajW k ) U R (a 0 jW k ) if and only if U R (a; w k ) U R (a 0 ; w k ). Thus, type-relevant utility functions U S (a; bjW k ) and U R (ajW k ) inherit all important properties of state-relevant functions: strict concavity over actions, single-crossing, and symmetry with respect to optimal actions a S ( w k ) = w k + b and a R ( w k ) = w k . This gives the nocrossing property: a S ( w k ) > a R ( w k ), k 2 K. Based on these observations and using the same technique as that developed in Lemma 1 in Crawford and Sobel [6] , it follows that the number of induced actions in equilibrium is …nite. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1
In any equilibrium, the number of induced actions is …nite. Further, the distance between any two actions is not less than 2b.
Formally, the number of actions is …nite, since the strict concavity of U S (a; bjW k ) guarantees that the sender of each type induces at most two actions. However, the result of this lemma is stronger: it demonstrates that …niteness of the number of actions comes from the bias in the players'interests rather than from the cardinality of the type space. Thus, an increase in …neness of an information structure eventually does not bring further informational bene…ts, since the sender chooses among a …nite set of actions. As a result, for a substantially …ne partition, the sender's signaling strategy is no longer invertible, which leads to losses in information.
Thus, we may restrict the message space to a …nite set M 0 = fm i g
, where m i 2 M (a i ), i 2 I = 0; 1; :::; I 1. Then, conditional distributions (mjk) can be replaced by conditional probabilities i;k , where
(mjk) dm is a conditional probability to send a message m i , i 2 I, by the sender of a type k 2 K. From (5), the principal's best response a i = a (m i ), i 2 I, is
and the expected utility is
The family of inequalities U S (a i ; b; w k ) U S (a j ; b; w k ), i; j 2 I, k 2 K, can be written as 1) a i + a j w k + w k+1 + 2b for all a j > a i , and
2) a i + a j w k + w k+1 + 2b for all a j < a i .
The following lemma characterizes the sender's equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 2 Any equilibrium signaling strategy ( i;k ) satis…es the following conditions: (A) i;k > 0 implies j;k = 0 for all j < i 1 and j > i + 1; (B) I 1;n 1 = 1, and i;n 1 = 0 for all i < I 1; (C) i;k > 0 implies j;s = 0 for all s < k, j > i, and s > k, j < i, (D) i;k > 0 and i+1;k > 0 imply i+1;k+1 > 0 for all k < n 1, and (E) i;k > 0 and i;k 0 > 0 imply i;s = 1 for all s such that k < s < k 0 .
The …rst condition states that mixing is possible only between two messages that induce adjacent actions. The second requires the highest-type sender to purely induce the highest action. The third condition is the "monotonicity condition," which implies that if a sender of some type induces an action, then no sender of a higher type can induce a lower action, and vice versa. Condition (D) argues that if the k type sender induces two actions, then a (k + 1) type must induce the higher action also. Finally, condition (E) states that if some action is induced by types k and k 0 , then this action is purely induced by all types between k and k 0 .
Although Lemma 2 characterizes equilibrium strategies, it still leaves a lot of freedom in terms of players'expected payo¤s. To narrow the set of payo¤s, we need to formulate a model-speci…c revelation principle, which is described in the next section.
Revelation Principle
The lack of the principal's ability to commit to actions results in the failure of the standard revelation principle, which restricts the set of all equilibria outcomes to that of truthtelling direct equilibria. Two examples from contracting with imperfect commitment are due to Bester and Strausz [5] and Krishna and Morgan [11] . In both cases, the sender is characterized by a binary type, whereas three actions are induced in equilibria. No direct mechanism can replicate these equilibria in terms of induced actions and outcomes. Nevertheless, Bester and Strausz prove that for a …nite set of states any incentive-e¢ cient mechanism (i.e., that which provides equilibrium payo¤s on the Pareto frontier) is payo¤-equivalent to some direct mechanism. Similarly, Krishna and Morgan demonstrate that in the case of a continuum of types, any equilibrium outcome of an indirect mechanism can be replicated in a direct mechanism.
The following lemma proves that we can restrict attention to direct equilibria only; that is, the cardinality of the message space can be chosen to be equal to that of the type space, or I = n.
Lemma 3 Any equilibrium in the CWIIE model is payo¤ equivalent to some direct equilibrium.
To demonstrate the result of the above lemma, we show that there is no equilibrium in the model, in which the number of induced actions exceeds the number of types. Basically, in order to have an indirect equilibrium, there must be a type which induces two actions, such that the higher action is induced by this type only. However, this contradicts property (D) of Lemma 2. 11 Further, consider direct truth-telling, or incentive-compatible equilibria, in which the expert of each type k = 0; :::; n 1 discloses all available information by sending a type-speci…c message m k . Given this signaling strategy, the receiver's best-response is the action's rule a k = E [ w k jm k ] = w k . Thus, a partition is called incentive-compatible if there exists an incentive-compatible equilibrium.
From the sender's problem (7), the sender prefers to induce an action a k instead of a k+1 (and all a > a k+1 ), if
which can be simpli…ed to w k+2 w k 4b. Similarly, the condition to induce a k instead of a k 1 implies w k+1 w k 1 4b. Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a partition to be incentive-compatible is w k+2 w k 4b; k = 0; 1; :::; n 2.
This family of inequalities is called the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints.
The following lemma proves that any pure-strategy equilibrium is payo¤ equivalent to some incentive-compatible equilibrium under a slightly modi…ed partition. It is constructed from the initial one by the collapsing partition's elements that induce identical actions.
Lemma 4 For any pure-strategy equilibrium, there exists an incentive-compatible equilibrium, which is payo¤ equivalent. Now, we turn to mixed-strategy equilibria.
Mixed-strategy equilibria
In addition to pure-strategy equilibria, there exist multiple types of mixed-strategy equilibria even for the same information structure. The table below illustrates three examples of these equilibria. Notice that for the same partition, the last two equilibria in the table contrast in the number of induced actions: three in the former one and two in the latter one. Nevertheless, mixing between messages is detrimental, which is demonstrated by the following "no-mixing" lemma.
Lemma 5 For any mixed-strategy equilibrium, there exists an incentive-compatible equilibrium, which is payo¤ superior.
The superior equilibrium is constructed in two steps. First, we derive all sender's types that play mixed strategies and reassign the corresponding probabilities as follows. If some type induces two actions, we assign probability one to the lower action. Second, given the modi…ed signaling strategy, we collapse the partition elements that induce identical actions and adjust the receiver's beliefs and actions to a new signaling strategy.
The derived lemmas constitute a model-speci…c "revelation principle", which relates to the result of Bester and Strausz -any optimal equilibrium payo¤ can be replicated in an incentive-compatible equilibrium.
Optimal information structure
To …nd the optimal incentive-compatible partition, we …rst determine the maximal size of the incentive-compatible partition n (b) and all sequences of boundary points (w i ) n(b) 0 , which satisfy boundary conditions w 0 = 0, w n(b) = 1, and the IC constraints (9) . It can be shown that if b 6 = 1 2c for some even integer c, then
where hxi is the largest integer smaller than or equal to x. If b = 
48
, respectively. Thus, the receiver's losses due to non-uniform structure of the three-element partition are o¤set by bene…ts due to its …neness. Nevertheless, for b = 0:22, principal's payo¤s are 1 27 and 1 48 for the three-and two-element partitions, respectively. This is because a larger bias results in the less uniform structure of the …nest incentive-compatible partition (0; 0:12; 0:88; 1) due to the IC constraints. In contrast, there is no a such e¤ect for the uniform partition of a smaller size, which is still incentive-compatible.
Thus, we can establish the Pareto dominance of the CWIIE model over CS communication. 12 The second factor is the di¤ erence in the CS and CWIIE models, respectively. in lengths of partition elements. Due to the speci…c structure of equilibria, intervals of any CS partition essentially di¤er in their lengths, which results in higher informational losses for large values of a state. 13 On the other hand, for any equilibrium CS partition, a uniform partition of the same size is incentive-compatible in our model, which decreases a residual variance of .
Imperfect Information versus Delegation
Delegation is broadly considered as a pervasive alternative to communication. Instead of relying on expert's non-veri…able information, the policymaker can delegate his power to the expert and gain from informational e¢ ciency (see, for example, [1] , [7] , [10] , [13] ). However, informational bene…ts are impaired by losses because the expert's decisions are biased. Nevertheless, in a variety of situations, an aggregate e¤ect leads to ex-ante Paretoimprovement as compared to communication. Another useful feature of delegation is its ease in implementations: generally, there are no costs to empower the expert with a right to carry out policies. Due to these factors, more and more …rms decentralize their structures (see [7] ). The following example demonstrates how delegation can bring larger payo¤s to the principal than those in the case of CS communication. However, these payo¤s are smaller than those in the case of communication with the imperfectly informed expert. . If the principal delegates his rights completely, that is, without restrictions on the set of sender's feasible policies, then for any state , the sender implements her optimal policy a S ( ) = + b, which has a constant bias b relative to the receiver's optimal policy a R ( ) = . This brings ex-post utilities to the sender and the receiver U D S ( ) = 0 and
, which are equal to corresponding ex-ante utilities. Therefore, the expected payo¤ of the principal exceeds that in CS communication. However, if the receiver partitions the state space into two equal intervals, then his expected payo¤ in the incentivecompatible equilibrium under this partition is U R = 1 48 , which is larger than that under delegation.
Before testing the generality of these results, note that the full or complete delegation is not necessarily optimal in the space of all delegation sets, that is, the sets of actions that can be delegated to the sender. Melumad and Shibano [13] prove that the optimal delegation set for the uniform-quadratic settings is an interval [0; y 0 ], where the upper bound y 0 = 1 b if b 1 2 and y 0 = 1 2 otherwise. Also, Dessein [7] shows that in the same model, delegation is always bene…cial for the principal as opposed to CS communication whenever communication is informative.
Delegation and communication with the imperfectly informed sender utilize di¤erent factors for the payo¤s'improvement. Delegation allows for the receiver to acquire bene…ts from the expert's informational advantage. If endowed with power, the sender conducts a policy which is close enough to the receiver's optimal policy. Communication with the , then communication with the imperfectly informed sender strictly dominates delegation in terms of receiver's expected payo¤. This result is formalized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3
If the informative communication is feasible, then there exists an equilibrium in the CWIIE model which provides a higher expected payo¤ to the principal than optimal delegation. Fig. 2 demonstrates the principal's expected payo¤ under the optimal partition in the CWIIE model, optimal delegation, and the most informative equilibrium in the CS model.
Compared to other models, an interesting feature of the CWIIE model is the discontinuity of payo¤s in the sender's bias b due to the "regime switching" e¤ect. When b falls, this e¤ect takes place atb (n) = 1 2n for even n, and the uniform partition of the even size n becomes incentive-compatible. This leads to a switch from the uniform partition of the odd size n 1 to the uniform of size n. As a result, the ex-ante payo¤s jump from In contrast, there is no discontinuity at b (n), the point of a switch from the uniform partition of the even size n 1 to the non-uniform one of the odd size n. For almost all b such that the partition of even size n 1 is incentive-compatible, 14 there exists a partition of the odd size n, which is also incentive-compatible (namely, for which the IC conditions (9) are binding). However, this partition is non-uniform for b > 1 2n and provides payo¤ U n R (b), which is continuous with respect to b. 15 Thus, the switch between partitions at
2 is not accompanied by a discontinuous change in payo¤s.
Generalizations
This section examines the robustness of the previous results to changes in the speci…cation of the model, namely players' utility functions and distributions of the state. First, we consider the generalized form of the players' utility functions similar to that used by Dessein [7] . The receiver's utility function U R (a; ) has a unique maximum for a = and can be written as
where U 2 (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, and U 0
2 (:) to be continuous in the neighborhood of 0. Similarly, the sender's utility function U S (a; b; ) has a maximum for a = + b and can be written as
where V 0 2 (x) 0 and V 00 2 (x) < 0. For future references, we will refer to (11) and (12) as symmetric preferences.
Given these conditions, it can be shown that for any
is symmetric in a with respect to a S = w k + b. Similarly, the receiver's utility function U R (ajW k ) is concave in a and symmetric with respect to w k . This implies that the receiver's best-response to the truth-telling signaling strategy m (k) = m k is a (m k ) = w k . Therefore, the IC constraints (9) also hold, and the optimal information structure is the same as determined by Proposition 1 up to values b (c). Essentially, communication can be informative only if the bias b , there exists an equilibrium in the CWIIE model which is Pareto superior to all equilibria in the CS model.
As in the case of the quadratic preferences, given any CS partition, the uniform partition of the same size in the CWIIE model is incentive-compatible. Due to risk-aversion of the principal, it provides the superior expected utility.
Before we compare principal's payo¤ in our model with that in delegation, notice that for the class of interval delegation sets (i.e., a expert's policy must belong to a single interval) and b 
that for all b < b , there exists an equilibrium in the CWIIE model, which provides a superior outcome to the receiver compared to that in optimal delegation. This result is weaker than Theorem 3 for the case of the quadratic preferences since it does not guarantee that the CWIIE model performs better than delegation whenever informative communication is feasible. An example demonstrates that this result cannot be strengthened because of the risk-aversion of the principal. 16 In communication, an induced action is unbiased on average, but there is a chance that it is far from the optimal action (if a state is close to a boundary of a partition element). This increases informational losses for essentially concave utility functions. Delegation, however, provides a permanent bias b, which is more preferable by the highly risk-averse principal. Nevertheless, when the bias is small, the optimal information structure becomes su¢ ciently …ne to reduce the variance between optimal and induced actions, which results in better performance of the CWIIE model over delegation.
Another approach to generalize model's settings is to extend the case of the uniform distribution function of the state. In particular, we restrict attention to the class of distributions with a positive and continuously di¤erentiable density and supported on a bounded interval. In this case, the result of Theorem 2 is completely robust.
Theorem 6 Suppose preferences are quadratic. For any distribution function of with a positive and continuously di¤ erentiable density on a bounded support, there exists an equilibrium in the CWIIE model which is superior to all informative equilibria in the CS model.
In general, any informative CS partition is characterized by high informational losses for large values of . Thus, it can be modi…ed by the principal in a such way that it is incentive-compatible in the CWIIE model and "more uniform", which reduces a residual variance of .
Similarly, the theorem below compares principal's payo¤s in the CWIIE model with that in complete delegation. It demonstrates that the result of Theorem 3 for general distributions holds, if the sender's bias is small. 17
Theorem 7 Suppose preferences are quadratic. For any distribution function of with a positive and continuously di¤ erentiable density on a bounded support, there isb such that for all b <b, there exists an equilibrium in the CWIIE model, which provides a superior payo¤ to the receiver compared to that in the complete delegation. 1 6 Consider the principal's utility function U1 (w; w) = 0, U2 (w) = jwj 7 , and the bias b = 0:126. Then the optimal partition in the CWIIE model is the uniform three-element one. It is informative and provides expected utility UR ' 4:5 10
7 . However, optimal delegation gives U D R = 3:9 10 7 , which is superior to that in the CWIIE model. 1 7 The problem of optimal delegation for general distributions and quadratic preferences is solved by Alonso and Matouschek [1] . They provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for delegation sets to be optimal for cases of complete delegation, centralization (the delegation set that contains only the principal's preferred actions given prior information), and interval delegation. However, when the players'preferences are su¢ ciently close, one can expect that principal's incentives to restrict sender's actions are small, and the optimal delegation set and players'outcomes converge to that of the case of complete delegation.
When the sender's bias converges to zero, a size of intervals in the …nest incentivecompatible partition converges to 2b regardless of the distribution. Equivalently, the number of elements n (b) in the …nest incentive-compatible partition grows as 1 2b , exactly as in the case of the uniform distribution. This implies that the principal's expected utility in the most informative equilibrium falls as
3 , in contrast to b 2 in delegation.
Multi-Stage Communication
In general, communication between players may not be restricted to a single stage. Moreover, the example of oil lease sales demonstrates that the principal can determine the precision of the expert's information in every round, and request a new report afterwards. In this context, our central result is that by proper updating the expert's information from stage to stage, the principal can disclose approximately full information in some interval of the state space due to expert's truth-telling communication in all stages.
Krishna and Morgan [12] describe multi-stage communication in the CS model without updating sender's information. In this case, the set of equilibrium outcomes is identical to that in the one-stage communication game. Since the expert knows all information before the communication starts, she sends the sequence of messages that induces the most preferable action. However, without information update from stage to stage, the receiver infers the same information about the state as in the one-stage case. Thus, the set of induced actions is also not a¤ected, and any equilibrium in an multi-stage game is equivalent to that in the one-stage game. This argument can be directly reapplied to the case of an imperfectly informed expert without information updating. In contrast, if the expert's information is insigni…cantly updated at every stage, the outcome of the multi-stage communication di¤ers signi…cantly from the one-stage case.
To introduce such updating in the model, the receiver speci…es a communication schedule: a family of sets fW s k g ns 1;T k=0;s=1 , where n s sets fW s k g ns 1 k=0 form a partition of at every round of communication s = 1; :::; T < 1. Once chosen, a communication schedule becomes common knowledge.
In every stage s, the sender observes an index i s of the partition's element W s is , which contains , and transmits a message m s 2 M to the receiver. Thus, the imprecision of the sender's information about the state is determined by a measure of the set
The sender's signaling strategy is a mapping from the space of all sequences (i s ) T 1 to a probability distribution over the message set Example 3. Take the sender's bias b = 0:21. In the one-stage game, the uniform two-element partition is optimal and provides receiver's ex-ante payo¤ Suppose that at the …rst stage the sender observes i 1 = 1, which means that is uniformly distributed over the interval W 1 1 . Given this information, the sender's utility function U S a; bjW 1 1 is maximized at a 0 = w 1 +w 0 2 +b = 1:13. Also, her current information will not be updated in the next round since W 1 1 W 2 1 . Then, the message m 1 induces the action a 1 for any message in the second stage. 18 The message m 0 can induce actions a 00 and a 01 , depending on the message in the next stage. Since U S :; bjW 1 1 is increasing for all a < a 0 and max (a 00 ; a 01 ) < a 1 < a 0 , then the sender strictly prefers to transmit the message m 1 .
If i 1 = 0, then the sender infers that 2 W 1 0 , and her current information will be updated in the next stage. Then, the message m 1 induces the action a 1 , which provides the expected payo¤ U S a 1 ; bjW 1 0 ' 
Thus, the sender still has no incentives to distort information. In the second round, let i 2 = 1. If i 1 = 1, then according to the analysis above, the sender induces the action a 1 in the …rst stage by sending the message m 1 . If i 1 = 0, then she infers that 2 W 1 0 \ W 2 1 = (0:42; 0:84], and her optimal action becomes a 00 = w 2 +w 1 2 + b = 0:84. Given the message m 0 in the …rst round, messages m 1 and m 0 in the second round induce actions a 01 and a 00 , respectively. Because a 00 < a 01 < a 00 , it follows that sending message m 1 is strictly preferable to m 0 .
If i 2 = 0, then the sender deduces that 2 W 2 0 . Given the message m 0 in the …rst stage, the sender can induce actions a 00 and a 01 only. Notice that U S a 00 ; bjW 2 0 = U S a 01 ; bjW 2 0 , since the distance between sender's optimal policy a 000 = w 3 +w 2 2 + b = 0:42 and actions a 01 and a 00 is the same. Thus, the sender still cannot deviate from revealing her information. It can be easily seen that induced actions are the receiver's best-response to the sender's truth-telling strategy.
The expected utility of the receiver in this equilibrium is approximately 1 79 , which exceeds that in the most informative equilibrium in the one-stage game. This is because conveyed information in the described equilibrium is equivalent to that in the one-stage communication under a partition (w k ) = (0; 0:42; 0:84; 1) and the truth-telling signaling strategy. However, truth-telling is not the equilibrium strategy, since it violates the IC constraints (9): w 3 w 1 = 0:58 < 0:84 = 4b.
The revealing mechanism
Now, we present our major result for the multi-stage communication. There exists a communication schedule, through which the receiver can reveal (almost) all information in the interval , where we let w 0 = 1 and w T +1 = 0. Consider a decreasing communication schedule, depicted in Fig.3 , such that w T 1 4b; 0 < w T < w T 1 , w 0 = 1, and w T +1 = 0.
Then, the sequence ( w s )
, where w s = ws+w s 1 2
, s = 1; :::; T + 1, is also decreasing. ), which means a belief that is uniformly distributed on i with probability ( i j:).
Given this setup, the main result is characterized by the following theorem. Condition 1 describes the truth-telling signaling strategy of the sender. Condition 2 is the receiver's best-response, given his posterior beliefs. Condition 3 outlines principal's posterior probabilities of 2 i for both non-zero-probability and zero-probability messages of the sender.
Theorem 8 For any decreasing communication schedule ( s )
T
Corollary 1 By choosing a decreasing communication schedule (w s )
T 1 such that w T 1 = 4b, 0 < w T < 4b, and max By slight updating information at all stages except the last two, the sender seems to get a small piece of information at every stage. This argument is misleading, however. If the sender observes i s 1 = 0 in stage s 1 and i s = 1 in stage s, then she infers that 2 W
Hence, her information about the state becomes very precise. The main argument is that given this updated information and the receiver's beliefs, the sender's best feasible action is the one which will be implemented after revealing her information truthfully. In contrast, if i s = 0, the sender's information is still essentially vague and will be improved in the future. Due to risk-aversion and su¢ ciently imprecise information, the sender's expected payo¤ from transmitting a distorted message m 1 (and inducing the action a = w s ) is quite low, and this signaling strategy is strictly dominated by providing truthful information at this and all future stages. The crucial condition is that, given i s = 0, the quality of sender's information must be su¢ ciently imperfect, which is achieved by choosing the a su¢ ciently coarse structure of partitions in the last two stages (w T 1 4b).
Extensions and Discussion
In this section, we discuss several issues: the principal's utility in the multi-stage model as the number of stages increases without bound; a comparison of e¢ ciency of multi-stage communication versus one-stage communication; and the possibility to commit to actions in some stages of the communication process.
The limit of disclosed information
When max s=1;:::;T 1 jw s w s 1 j ! 0 as T ! 1, approximately full information is revealed in the interval [4b; 1]. Thus, the principal's expected utility in the described equilibrium is determined by boundary points w T 1 and w T in the last two stages
Given constraint (13), U lim R (w T 1 ; w T ) is maximized at w T 1 = 4b and w T = 2b, which results in the limit of the expected utility
The full disclosure of information in the interval [4b; 1] requires in…nitely many stages of communication. Given the principal's utility U T R in the game with T stages, a relative di¤erence between U T R and the limiting utility U lim R , that is,
can serve as the measure of imperfection of disclosed information. Referring to the case of b = 0:21, the limit of the receiver's expected utility in the multi-stage equilibrium is U 
One-stage versus multi-stage communication
As mentioned above, when the bias in players' preferences b tends to 0, the number of intervals n (b) of the optimal partition in one-stage communication grows as 1 2b , so that the length of an interval w decreases as 2b. Thus, the principal's expected utility grows as n (b)
In multi-stage communication, information cannot be fully revealed only if < 4b, which implies that the principal's expected utility increases as a third power of b. As a result, the e¢ ciency of multi-stage communication relative to one-stage rises in…nitely as the con ‡ict of interest falls.
Commitment
In the previous analysis, we have considered a pure cheap-talk game, that is, unconditionally on the expert's information, the principal has full authority over policies. Here, we introduce an extension of the multi-stage model to a combination of communication in some stages with delegation in others. The main result is that such combination extends the interval, in which approximately full information can be revealed, from [4b; 1] to (1 4b)
the bias is so large (b 2 5 ) that no informative communication is achievable in the cheap-talk game.
Notice that the possibility to commit increases the principal's utility not because of expert's informational superiority, but through a di¤erent channel. If the state < w T 1 , then it will be imperfectly revealed in the last stage of the cheap-talk multi-stage game. However, communication in the last stage is equivalent to the one-stage communication game with an imperfectly informed expert, which provides a higher payo¤ than delegation. Thus, the principal cannot bene…t from the expert's informational superiority. The possibility to implement the expert's favorite policy in the last stage serves as an attractive "carrot", which enforces her incentives to communicate truthfully in the previous stages.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that by properly restricting the quality of the expert's information, the principal can obtain more information, and get a higher payo¤, than in the CS model of communication. Moreover, our model leads to a superior expected payo¤ than that provided by delegation. These results generally remain true for a wide class of preferences and distributions.
Communication with an imperfectly informed expert in multiple rounds, where the principal controls the quality of the expert's information in every round, can elicit almost all information for a large interval of the state space. This results in an ex-ante Paretoimprovement compared to one-stage communication. When considering the example of an oil…eld lease, the government can get more precise geological data from private companies (which collect data) if it imposes proper restrictions on the number and locations of test drills, and obtains copies of the reports after each stage of the process of exploration.
Another important aspect of the presented model is the number of equilibria, significantly exceeding the number of equilibria in Crawford and Sobel. In addition to purestrategy equilibria, there exist multiple mixed-strategy equilibria even with the same partition. Nevertheless, despite the fact that all mixed-strategy equilibria are payo¤ inferior to pure-strategy ones, they can still be superior to equilibria in the CS model. In the case of the multi-stage communication, the constructed locally revealing equilibrium is not unique. There exist other less informative babbling and semi-babbling equilibria such that the sender does not reveal information in some stages of the communication process.
We did not address deliberately the case when the person who determines the quality of the expert's information is the expert herself. In this case, if there exists a credible mechanism of the expert's commitment, i.e., the expert commits "not to know too much", then the result will be the same in terms of disclosed information due to the closeness of the expert's and principal's interests.
Appendix
In this section we provide proofs of the lemmas and theorems.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let a and a 0 be two induced actions, where a 0 > a. Consider types k and
The single-crossing property of the sender's state-relevant utility function
property leads to (i) a < a S ( ) < a 0 , where a S ( ) = + b, (ii) a is not induced by any type i such that w i > , and (iii) a 0 is not induced by any type i such that w i < . The last two properties along with the single-crossing property of U R (a; ) imply a a R ( ) = a 0 .
In addition, the symmetry of U S (a; b; ) with respect to a S ( ) implies that a
2 . This means that both a S ( ) and a R ( ) belong to the interval [a;
To complete the proof, notice that the set of induced actions is bounded by a R (0) and a R (1).
Proof of Lemma 2. (A)
This property follows from a strict concavity of U S (a; bjW k ) in a: By contradiction, let i;k > 0 and j;k > 0; where j > i + 1, for some k. This implies that
Since a i+1 can be represented as a convex combination of a i and a j , a i+1 = a i + (1 ) a j for some 2 (0; 1), this results in a contradiction (6), the maximal induced action a I 1 w n 1 < w n 1 + b. Since U S (a; bjW k ) is strictly increasing in a, for all a < w k + b, the result follows immediately.
(C) Let i;k > 0 and j;s > 0 for some s > k and j < i.
(D) By contradiction, let i;k > 0, i+1;k > 0, and i+1;k+1 = 0 for some k < n 1. Condition (C) for i;k > 0 implies i+1;s = 0 for all s < k. Condition (C) for i+1;k implies j;k+1 = 0 for all j < i + 1. Since i+1;k+1 = 0, then j 0 ;k+1 > 0 for some j 0 > i + 1. Again, using condition (C) for j 0 ;k+1 , we have i+1;s = 0 for all s > k + 1: Hence, i+1;s = 0 for all s 6 = k: It follows from (6) that a i+1 = w k . Then, i;k > 0 and i+1;k > 0 imply U S (a i ; bjW k ) = U S (a i+1 ; bjW k ), which results in a contradiction a i < w k + b < a i+1 = w k .
(E) This is a corollary of property (C). If i;k > 0, then j;s = 0 for all j < i and s > k. Similarly, i;k 0 > 0 implies j;s = 0, j > i , s < k 0 . Thus, for all s such that k < s < k 0 , we have j;s = 0; j 6 = i, that gives the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 3. By contradiction, suppose that there exists an indirect equilibrium, in which the number of induced actions exceeds the number of types, that is, I > n. This implies that there exists a type k such that i;k > 0, i+1;k > 0, and i+1;k+1 = 0. Since the highest type n 1 does not mix (by property (B) of Lemma 2), it follows that k < n 1. Then, property (D) of Lemma 2 is violated, which completes the proof.
Given an equilibrium signaling strategy ( i;k ), de…ne a correspondence p : I =) K such that p (i) = fk 2 K : i;k > 0g. Thus, p (i) determines the subset of types, inducing action a i . Similarly, de…ne a function j : K ! I such that j (k) = min fi 2 I : i;k > 0g, and a correspondence :
action induced by the sender of k-type. Conversely, given an action a i , (i) determines the set of types, for which this action is minimal. That is, if k 2 (i), then l;k = 0 for all l < i. The next lemma describes properties of p (i), j (k), and (i).
Lemma 6 p (i), j (k), and (i) satisfy the following properties. a) j (k) is (weakly) increasing, b) (i) is non-empty, strictly increasing, and convex-valued, c) p (i) is non-empty, (weakly) increasing, and convex-valued. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, p (i) is strictly increasing, and d) (i) p (i) and max (i) = max p (i).
Proof a) j (k) = i implies i;k > 0. Property (C) of Lemma 2 results in i 0 ;k 0 = 0 for all is strictly increasing, by contradiction let i 0 > i and k
, and k 00 2 (i). Thus,
c) The …rst part of the statement can be easily proved using the same techniques as those developed in the (i) context. The second part follows from the fact that p (i) = (i) in a purestrategy equilibrium, hence p (i) is strictly increasing. d) For any k 2 (i), we have j (k) = i. This results in i;k > 0, so k 2 p (i) and (i) p (i). Now, for a given i 0 consider k 00 = max (i 0 ) = max fk 2 K : j (k) = i 0 g. Therefore, i 0 ;k 00 > 0, and i 0 ;k = 0 for all k > k 00 . If not, i.e., i 0 ;k > 0 for some k > k 00 , then condition (C) implies i;k = 0 for all i < i 0 . This means i 0 = min (i : i;k > 0) = j (k), which contradicts k 00 = max (i 0 ).
Thus, i 0 ;k = 0 for all k > k 00 , which results in k k 00 for all k 2 p (i 0 ). Thus, max p (i) max (i).
Since both (i) and p (i) are non-empty, there exists k 
is convex-valued, the receiver's best-response can be written as
Proof of Lemma 4. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, the receiver's best-response is
and the expected payo¤ is
Consider the partition fW
, i2 I, and the signaling strategy m (i) = m i , i2 I. It easily follows that the receiver's best-response is not a¤ected by these transformations.
Since ( i;k ) is an equilibrium strategy, then for any i 2 I, we have
According to (7) , this implies U S (a i ; bjW
i ) for all a l < a i . Therefore, the described strategies constitute an incentive-compatible equilibrium under the modi…ed partition. Payo¤ equivalence between the initial and the constructed equilibria follows straightforwardly. Now, consider a sequence
Lemma 7 In any equilibrium (( i;k ) ; (a i ) ; ), we have a i a i , i2 I.
Proof For any i2 I, if i;k 0
, and
Comparing the last expression with (15), it follows that
Finally, we complete the proof by showing that a i is decreasing in i;k 0 p (i) and increasing in i;k 00
Since Proof of Lemma 5. Using property (A) of Lemma (2), we may represent the receiver's expected utility in an equilibrium ((a i ) ; ( i;k ) ; ) as
Modify the signaling strategy ( i;k ) as follows: derive all types K that induce two actions, and put 0 j(k);k = 1 for all k 2 K. That is, if the sender of k-type induced two actions in the initial equilibrium, now she purely induces a lower action.
Notice that U S a j(k) ; bjW k = U S a j(k)+1 ; bjW k for all k 2 K. The single-crossing property
Multiplying each term by P (W k ) and summing across all k 2 K result in 
and summing across all i 2 I result in
and the signaling strategy ( i;s ), i,s 2 I, such that m (i) = m i , i 2 I. A collapse of partition's elements does not a¤ect the receiver's best-response, so the optimal action's rule is a i , i 2 I. This
We complete the proof by showing that ( i;s ) is incentive-compatible. That is, w k 0 (i+2) w k 0 (i) 4b for all i = 0; :::; I 2. Since i;k 00 (i) belongs to the initial equilibrium pro…le for each i 2 I, we have U S a i ; bjW k 00 (i) U S a i+1 ; bjW k 00 (i) . This implies
From Lemma 7, a i a i and a i+1 a i+1 . Combining these inequalities results in
Lemma 8 If the uniform partition of size n is incentive-compatible, then the incentive-compatible equilibrium under this partition is payo¤ superior to any incentive-compatible equilibrium under a partition of the same size.
Proof The ex-ante utility of the receiver in an incentive-compatible equilibrium is
Clearly, f (x) is strictly concave for x > 0 and 
Lemma 9
If a partition of size n is incentive-compatible, then the uniform partition of size n 1 is incentive-compatible also.
Proof Since a partition (w k ) n 0 is incentive-compatible, we have w n = 1 w n 2 + 4b :::
n 1 2 4b for odd n, and w n = 1 w n 2 + 4b ::: w 0 + n 1 2 4b = n 1 2 4b for even n. In both cases, Lemma 10 Among all partitions of an odd size n such that Proof We prove the lemma using the Karamata's inequality. 20 Let sequences (x k ) n 1 and (y k ) n 1 be non-increasing, so x 1 x 2 ::: x n and y 1 y 2 ::: y n . If all the following conditions satis…ed: x 1 y 1 ; x 1 + x 2 y 1 + y 2 ; x 1 + x 2 + x 3 y 1 + y 2 + y 3 ; :::; x 1 + x 2 + ::: + x n 1 y 1 + y 2 + ::: + y n 1 , and x 1 + x 2 + ::: + x n = y 1 + y 2 + ::: + y n , then we say that (x i ) n 1 majorizes (y i ) n 1 . The Karamata's inequality states that if (x i ) majorizes (y i ), and a function f (x) is continuos and concave, then
From (16), the receiver's ex-ante payo¤ in the incentive-compatible equilibrium is
3 , which is continuous and strictly concave for x > 0. Consider the sequence (y k ) n 0 , for which the IC conditions are binding, so y k = 2kb for even k, and y k = 1 2b (n k) for odd k. We need to show that if
, which satis…es (9). The IC conditions (9) can be written as w k+2 w k = w k+2 w k+1 + w k+1 w k = w k+1 + w k 4b; k = 0; 1:::; n 2:
For the sequence (y k ) n 0 , we have y k = y k+1 y k = 1 2b (n k 1) 2bk = 1 2b (n 1) for even k. The condition b < , and Y k = 1 2b (n 1) for k 2 S 2 = n+1 2 ; :::; n. Note that S 1 has one element less than S 2 , since n is odd. Also, the IC conditions imply that
Now, consider a sequence (w k ) n 0 , which satis…es (9) . We need to show that a non-increasing
First, for even k, we have w k w k 2 + 4b :::
can be represented as (X k ) n 1 = (X 1 ; X 2 ; :::; X n 1 2 ; X n+1 2 ; :::; X n ), where X j Y k for all j; k 2 S 1 , and X j Y k for all j; k 2 S 2 . This means that P
Also, the IC conditions require that for any k 2S 2 = S 2 fng = n+1 2 ; :::; n 1, there must exist q (k) 2 S 1 such that X q(k) + X k 4b, which we de…ne as follows. Denote i n to be the index of the smallest element w in of the sequence ( w k ), which implies w in = X n . Then, for all X k , k 2S 2 , if X k = w i , then X q(k) = w i+1 for i < i n , and X q(k) = w i 1 for i > i n . Notice that
Clearly, X 1 Y 1 ; X 1 + X 2 Y 1 +Y 2 ; :::; X 1 +:::
. Also,
The argument can be reapplied iteratively for all k 2S 2 . Since
completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. We can rewrite n (b) as follows: if . In the …rst case, the uniform partition of size c is incentive-compatible, hence it is optimal and brings ex-ante utility to the receiver U R = 1 12c 2 . In the second case, Lemma (10) implies that among all partitions of size c = n (b), the superior partition is that with binding IC constraints (9) . It provides the receiver's ex-ante payo¤ Proof of Theorem 2. Formally, it is straightforward to prove that for any equilibrium partition in the CS model, the uniform partition of the same size is incentive-compatible in the CWIIE model and provides a superior ex-ante payo¤ to the receiver. However, Theorem 3 below proves that for b 1 4 , there exists an equilibrium in the CWIIE model which provides a higher expected payo¤ to the principal than optimal delegation. Due to Dessein [7] , delegation performs better than CS communication for b 
where hxi is the largest integer smaller than or equal to x. Then, 2N CS (b) b 2b( The receiver's expected utility in the most informative CS equilibrium is
Since f (x) is strictly concave and w k+1 = w k + 4b 6 = w k from the CS "arbitrage condition", then the Jensen's inequality implies f Proof of Theorem 5. If preferences are symmetric, we use Proposition 4 from Alonso and Matouschek [1] , which implies that the optimal delegation set is the same as for quadratic preferences, hence, it is the interval [0; 1 b]. Similarly, the sender's policy is determined by (18). This results in the receiver's ex-ante utility 1. From (20), the receiver's ex-ante utility under the uniform partition of size c is U R (c) = EU 1 + 2c
Since U 2 (:) is decreasing, it follows that U R is increasing in c. Proof of Theorem 6. The "arbitrage condition" in the CS model is
In the CWIIE model, the sender's type-relevant utility function is
This function is concave and symmetric with respect to a S k = a k + b. Thus, the IC constraints a S k a k a k+1 a S k can be written as a k+1 a k 2b, k = 0; :::; n 2.
The condition (21) can be expressed as a k+1 a k = 2 (w k+1 a k ) + 2b > 2b, since w k+1 > a k = E [ j 2 (w k ; w k+1 ]] for f ( ) = F 0 ( ) > 0. Thus, any CS partition (w k ) n 0 is incentive-compatible in the CWIIE model. Moreover, IC conditions (23) are satis…ed for all w 0 k in some neighborhood of w k , k = 1; :::; n 1, since a k , k = 0; :::; n 1, are continuous in all w k .
The receiver's ex-ante utility in the incentive-compatible equilibrium is
To complete the proof, it easily follows that the described signaling strategy generates beliefs that is uniformly distributed on i = (w i ; w i 1 ], and a (m s ) T s=1 = w j is a best-response of the receiver given his beliefs.
